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ABSTRACT
Background: In October 2004, the Ugandan Police
department deployed enhanced traffic safety patrols on
the four major roads to the capital Kampala.
Objective: To assess the costs and potential effective-
ness of increasing traffic enforcement in Uganda.
Methods: Record review and key informant interviews
were conducted at 10 police stations along the highways
that were patrolled. Monthly data on traffic citations and
casualties were reviewed for January 2001 to December
2005; time series (ARIMA) regression was used to assess
for a statistically significant change in traffic deaths. Costs
were computed from the perspective of the police
department in $US 2005. Cost offsets from savings to the
health sector were not included.
Results: The annual cost of deploying the four squads of
traffic patrols (20 officers, four vehicles, equipment,
administration) is estimated at $72,000. Since deploy-
ment, the number of citations has increased substantially
with a value of $327 311 annually. Monthly crash data
pre- and post-intervention show a statistically significant
17% drop in road deaths after the intervention. The
average cost-effectiveness of better road safety enfor-
cement in Uganda is $603 per death averted or $27 per
life year saved discounted at 3% (equivalent to 9% of
Uganda’s $300 GDP per capita).
Conclusion: The costs of traffic safety enforcement are
low in comparison to the potential number of lives saved
and revenue generated. Increasing enforcement of
existing traffic safety norms can prove to be an extremely
cost-effective public health intervention in low-income
countries, even from a government perspective.
Road traffic injuries kill over a million people
annually, 90% of whom live in low- and middle-
income countries. For the world’s poorest coun-
tries, the problem is expected to worsen in coming
decades because the burden of traffic casualties
rises in the early stages of economic development
with increased motorization of the economy.1–3
Wealthy countries in advanced stages of develop-
ment have been able to control the number of fatal
crashes through a variety of countermeasures
including occupant protection, better roads, effec-
tive trauma systems, and the enforcement of
traffic laws. There is hope that low-income
countries can implement some of these interven-
tions to control traffic casualties without passively
waiting for economic prosperity to propel invest-
ments in safer vehicles, roads, and drivers.
There have been few effectiveness studies and
fewer cost-effectiveness studies of road-safety
interventions in low-income countries.4 5 One of
the principal traffic safety measures is the enforce-
ment of traffic safety codes accompanied by media
outreach. The European Transport Safety council
estimates that if all current road safety laws were
enforced in the European Union, deaths and
serious injuries could be reduced by up to 50%.6
Despite the promise traffic enforcement has
shown, there have been few studies to evaluate
the effectiveness of traffic law enforcement in low-
income countries.7 In Malaysia, more stringent
driving codes preceded by an information cam-
paign reduced visibility-related crashes by 29%.8
Evidence from a study in Brazil showed a reduction
of 25% in fatalities after a program of enforcement
and media was launched.9 Legislative changes in
Rwanda were followed up in 2003 by a public
awareness campaign and stiffer penalties for lack of
seatbelt use or failure to wear helmets on motor-
cycles; WHO reports that the annual number of
traffic deaths dropped by about 30% in the year
after the intervention.10
No data on the cost-effectiveness of enforcement
accompanied any of these studies. Bishai and
Hyder developed a cost model and estimated that
if the Brazilian traffic law enforcement strategy
was applied in sub-Saharan Africa, it could lead to
a cost-effectiveness ratio of $313 per death
averted.5 The Bishai and Hyder study was limited
in that neither estimates of the cost of the
intervention nor the presumed efficacy of the
intervention in sub-Saharan Africa could be vali-
dated against field measurements because there
had been no published studies on this topic from
Africa.
Given the magnitude of the global road traffic
injury epidemic and the absence of formal evalua-
tions of interventions in low-income countries, this
study was designed to evaluate an effort to
introduce effective traffic enforcement patrols in
Uganda in 2004. The specific objectives of this
study were: (1) to examine monthly crash statistics
before and after the intervention in order to
determine the intervention’s potential effect on
traffic fatalities; and (2) to compare the costs of the
intervention to the number of lives saved in
Uganda. This paper hopes to remedy the lack of
empirical data from sub-Saharan Africa and to
contribute new information on the cost-effective-
ness of traffic enforcement for low-income coun-
tries.
METHODS
Prior to 2004, traffic enforcement in Kampala
(largest city in Uganda) had primarily consisted
of stationing foot patrols on traffic islands in busy
intersections. In 2004 the police department
acquired four patrol cars and equipped them with
speed detecting radar. They hired and trained 20
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traffic officers to be deployed in mobile teams. In October 2004
they began daily enforcement of traffic regulations on the four
main roads leading into Kampala city. The four teams carried
out their enforcement efforts each day of the week from 06:00
to 18:30. The squads would alter their location on a daily basis
and split the task of identifying violators and flagging them to
stop, among the members of the team. Each team was trained
and equipped to use a Doppler radar to measure speeds, but
teams noted delays in servicing the radars that broke down. In
practice the violations that officers tended to enforce were
unsafe loading, careless driving and speeding (on days when the
radar devices were operational). After a motorist was stopped,
they could be additionally cited for license violations or alcohol
intoxication if these became apparent. Patrol cars were often
pressed into good Samaritan service as makeshift ambulances,
although neither the vehicles nor the officers were formally
outfitted for pre-hospital care.
In September 2005 our research team signed an agreement to
collaborate with the Ugandan police to examine the trends in
crashes before and after the 2004 intervention. The study was
designed to use a simple, pre-/post-intervention, quasi-experi-
mental design using police data. This was supplemented by the
use of interview data from police personnel and documentary
record review from official vehicle statistics in Uganda.
Beginning in January 2005 researchers traveled to the 10
police garrisons housing the traffic safety officials in charge of
all of the major trunk roads leading into and out of the capital
city of Kampala. These roads were also the ones which received
the intensive traffic enforcement after October 2004. At each
police garrison, the researchers examined the hand-written
monthly crash statistics dating back to 2001 and entered them
into a standardized template developed for the study in
Microsoft Excel. The number of garrison months varied by
the type of analysis conducted. A total of 564 out of a potential
600 garrison-months of data were available from the 10
garrisons across 5 years. Three garrisons had not completed
their statistics for 2005 so 36 garrison months of observations
were not available. Models that controlled for traffic volume
data were limited to 348 garrison-months of crash statistics
because four garrisons did not have traffic volume data. The
following monthly events were recorded by the police: (1)
number of fatal crashes; (2) number of people killed; (3) number
of total crashes; (4) number of serious crashes; and (5) number
of minor crashes. Fatal crashes were defined as dead on the
scene, which undercounts the total number of fatalities. This
case definition was unaltered before and after the intervention.
Key informant interviews were conducted with police
personnel to help establish estimates of costs and potential
obstacles to scale-up. Each of these interviews was transcribed
and independently analyzed by two member of the research
team. Data on road user volume during the study period were
based on the official estimates provided by the Ugandan Road
Authority in the Ministry of Works of the Government of
Uganda. The estimates of road user volume have not been
independently validated since no other source of such data is
known in the country.
The cost of the traffic safety intervention was determined
through ingredients based costing. The key informant inter-
views were used to determine the numbers of personnel,
vehicles, fuel, equipment, administration costs, and prices for
each of these items. All capital goods were assumed to undergo
straight line depreciation. Based on key informants, the useful
service life of vehicles was estimated as 10 years, and useful life
of radars, uniforms, and boots, as 3 years. All costs were
reported in 2005 Ugandan Shillings and converted to US dollars
at an exchange rate of 1800 Shillings per Dollar which was
prevailing at the time. Cost estimates are from the perspective
of the police department and do not include cost offsets from
prevented costs to the medical sector or to owners of wrecked
vehicles. Life years saved are discounted at 3% at baseline, and
sensitivity of results is compared to a discount rate of 10%.
Table 1 Balance sheet for highway traffic patrol in Uganda
Item Amount
Depreciation per
year*
Annualized
amount Price per unit per year Total Shillings (UGX) Total Dollars{
Cars 4 0.1 0.4 UGX 40 000 000 16 000 000 8889
Staff 20 1 20 UGX 1 800 000 36 000 000 20000
Middle managers 4 1 4 UGX 2 400 000 9 600 000 5333
Upper managers 4 1 4 UGX 4 800 000 19 200 000 10667
Fuel{ 16000 1 16000 UGX 2 200 35 200 000 19556
Radars 4 0.33 1.32 $4500 10 692 000 5940
Uniform 56 0.33 18.48 UGX 32 000 591 360 329
Breathalyzers 3 0.2 0.6 UGX 2 200 000 1 320 000 733
Boots 28 0.33 9.24 $25 415 800 231
Total 129 019 160 71677
*Vehicles, equipment, uniform, and boots depreciated at straight line depreciation. Useful life of 10 years assumed for cars; 3 years assumed for radars, boots, and uniforms.
{Conversion rate is 1800 UGX per US$ (2005).
{20 liters per day per car 6 4 cars 6 200 working days per year = 16 000 liters per year.
Figure 1 Time series of fatal crashes per month per road and persons
killed per month per road.
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The analysis of monthly crash data focused on determining
whether there was a significant change in the numbers of
adverse traffic events after the intervention began in October
2004. Three different dependent variables were used in the
statistical models: monthly counts of fatal crashes, total
crashes, and number killed. The independent variables were a
time trend and a dummy variable for observations which
occurred after October 2004. The first model examined was a
Poisson regression model based on the 564 garrison months of
data with a time trend and random effects for each garrison.
Annual estimates of traffic volume were available from the
central government for six of the garrisons, and Poisson models
in which volume was used as an offset variable were fitted to
this six-garrison data. The advantage of the Poisson model is its
ability to depict the probability of rare events like crashes and
fatalities. However, Poisson models do not properly account for
the autocorrelation in a monthly series of traffic statistics.
Autoregressive, integrated, moving average (ARIMA) models
were also used to control for autocorrelation and seasonality.11
In order to implement the ARIMA model, it was necessary to
pool data across all garrisons to form monthly counts of events
generating a sample size of 60 months of events. Sixteen
ARIMA permutations, ranging from 0 to 3 moving average
terms and 0 to 3 autoregressive terms were each examined to
ensure robustness to distributional assumptions. Besides the
intervention timing dummy, all models included a time trend, a
dummy for season, and annual measures of traffic volume.
General details on ARIMA models are available elsewhere.12
Incidence rate ratios were generated using both Poisson and
ARIMA models and used to estimate the impact of the
intervention in terms of potential lives saved. Using the average
age at death of road traffic victims in Uganda and expectation of
life for the country, the years of life saved from enforcement
were estimated. Finally, the costs of the interventions were used
to generate an estimate of the cost-effectiveness of enforcement
based on $ per discounted life year saved. This approach is
consistent with previously published methods for cost-effec-
tiveness, especially in the recent Disease Control Priorities
Project.13 The study was an analysis of aggregate secondary data
and thus exempted from ethical review by the Johns Hopkins
University Committee on Human Research.
RESULTS
Uganda is a sub-Saharan African country of 25 million people
experiencing a rising epidemic of road crashes. The annual
number of road crashes for Uganda in 2005 was estimated at
19 528, of which 1732 were fatal and resulted in a total of 2034
deaths. The number of crashes represents a 7% increase over
2004.
Table 1 shows the estimates of the annual cost of the
enforcement operation estimated at 129 million Ugandan
Shillings or US$72 000 in 2005 dollars. Fuel and personnel costs
accounted for the largest expenses. The police reported issuing
traffic citations in 2005 that would have been worth a total of
$327 000 if there were 100% collection. None of the key
informants in the police department were in a position to
estimate the percentage of this revenue that the Ugandan
treasury successfully collected. Given the estimate of an average
annual volume of 160 000 vehicles per year traveling the roads
studied in 2005, the enforcement intervention averages roughly
$0.50 per year per vehicle. The leading three reasons for all
violations were speeding (19%), breach of license (18%), and
dangerous loading by trucks (16%). Careless driving was also
cited in 14% of cases.
Data from the Ugandan Ministry of Works indicated an
average annual rate of growth of vehicles traveling on each road
at 5% annually. If one uses the official estimates of traffic
volume as the denominators to compute annual estimates of
crashes per vehicle, then crash rates per 1000 vehicles dropped
from a rate of 18.5 crashes per 1000 vehicles pre-intervention to
16.3 crashes per 1000 vehicles post-intervention.
Figure 1 plots the monthly estimates of fatal crashes per
month and the number killed per month per road before and
after the intervention, showing little seasonality and no
perceptible time trend prior to the October 2004 start date.
Table 2 shows the results of the statistical analysis. The Poisson
regression model shows that the intervention period has a
negative association with fatal crashes, total crashes and the
number killed. The ARIMA model also shows a similar pattern
of lower numbers of events after the intervention. The ARIMA
models were robust to multiple distributional assumptions
including deleting the seasonality, offset, and time trend terms.
Specifying different distributional assumptions for the AR and
MA terms showed statistically significant reductions (p values
from 0.01 to ,0.10) post-intervention event in 15 of 15 models
of fatal crashes, 13 of 15 models of total crashes, and 11 of 15
models of the number killed. The effects in the alternative
models were all of similar size, with alternative coefficients
typically falling between 5% higher and lower than the reported
coefficients in table 2.
The incidence rate ratios between pre-intervention and post-
intervention implied by the Poisson coefficients are 0.82 (95%
CI: 0.64 to 1.04), 0.86 (95% CI: 0.79 to 0.93), and 0.82 (95% CI:
0.66 to 1.01) for fatal crashes, total crashes, and number killed.
The incidence rate ratios implied by the ARIMA coefficients are
0.745 (95% CI: 0.58 to 0.91), 0.845 (95% CI: 0.71 to 0.98), and
0.727 (95% CI: 0.51 to 0.94) for the same respective outcomes.
The incidence rate ratio of 0.73 is equivalent to a 17 percentage
point reduction in the number killed.
The reported death count on the roads where the interven-
tion took place was 431 deaths in the year prior to the
intervention, representing approximately one fifth of the total
annual number of road deaths in the entire country of Uganda.
The national toll of road deaths in 2003–04 comprised 5%
drivers, 6% motorcyclists, 15% bicyclists, 34% passengers, and
40% pedestrians. Applying the incidence rate ratio of 0.727
estimated for the intervention would predict that in a year
subsequent to the intervention there would be 313 deaths, or a
total of 118 lives saved (95% CI: 26 to 211).
If one divides the $72 000 annual program costs by the
projected number of lives saved, one derives an estimated cost
per death averted of $603 (95% CI: $336 to $2746). The average
age of road crash victims in Uganda is reported at roughly 27.14
The life expectancy at age 20 is 35 additional years.15 With
discounting at 3% the additional 35 years per death averted is
worth 22 discounted years for each of the 118 lives saved. Thus,
the cost per death averted can be converted to $27 (95% CI: $15
to $118) per discounted life year saved. At a 10% discount the
cost per discounted life year saved approximately doubles.
DISCUSSION
Our finding that traffic enforcement saves lives at a cost of $27
per discounted life year saved would rank this intervention
among the most cost-effective public health interventions
(table 3). The estimate of $603 per death averted is higher than
the estimate of $313 per death averted from traffic enforcement
in Africa based on extrapolation and modeling.5 The earlier
estimate extrapolated a 25% reduction in fatalities reported
Original article
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from Brazil and estimated costs based on a theoretical model of
what it might cost to increase traffic enforcement in the average
sub-Saharan African country (table 3). The present estimate
represents a substantial methodological improvement, because
the effects and costs are estimated directly from Ugandan field
data.
The success of traffic law enforcement in low-income
countries can be markedly different from that in higher-income
countries due to differences in the effective functioning of
legal and administrative systems. Thus simply improving
the laws around speed limits, without substantial investments
in enforcement of speed limit laws may have much less effect
in a low-income country.16 Another example is the challenge
of using laws and law enforcement to improve occupant
protection vehicles in low-income and middle-income countries
when the vehicle stock has few functioning seat belts.17 A
review of the economic analysis of road traffic injury interven-
tions highlighted the fact that studies in high-income countries
assumed enforcement and compliance; while this could not be
the case in low-income countries where the costs of such
enforcement might be substantial.4 This study provides one case
study from Uganda to empirically support that premise.
An obvious limitation of this work is that benefit estimates
neglect all impact of the intervention on non-fatal injury; and
the cost estimates neglect all cost offsets due to savings to the
medical system. If each death averted also averted medical costs
and vehicular damage in excess of $603 it would make the
intervention cost-saving from the perspective of society. It
seems plausible that fatal crashes would typically be associated
with vehicular damage costs of at least this magnitude, but the
data collected did not assess these costs.
The events that were studied are subject to under-reporting,
because many crashes, even serious ones, are never reported to
the police. The method of comparing pre- and post-intervention
crash rates is vulnerable to bias from secular trends other than
the enforcement intervention that could have been responsible
for lowering the number of crashes. However, according to the
police that were interviewed and the Ugandan research team,
there were no other major interventions on these roads or in the
popular media or educational system that coincided with the
timing of the intervention. There were no interventions
targeted toward improved pre-hospital care on these roads
other than the presence of the police patrols themselves.
IMPLICATIONS FOR PREVENTION
To put the cost-effectiveness ratios in context, one can compare
the $27 per life year saved from traffic law enforcement to other
routinely accepted health interventions in sub-Saharan Africa
(table 3). The global public health community has made it a
high priority to scale up the distribution of antiretroviralT
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Table 3 Cost-effectiveness of road traffic injury interventions
Intervention*
Cost per DALY
(US$)
Improved enforcement (LMIC average) 5.25
Speed bumps at top 25 percentile dangerous junctions (LMIC
average)
8.89
Bicycle helmets (China) 107
Motorcycle helmets (Thailand) 467
Enforcement in Uganda{ 27
*Data from Disease Control Priorities in Developing Countries, Chapter 39 (www.dcp2.
org).
{Current study; using discounted life years only.
DALY, disability adjusted life year; LMIC, low- and middle-income countries.
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therapy for HIV in Uganda, and this intervention would cost
$600 per life year saved.18 Although there is no universal cut-off
that determines when an intervention would not be considered
cost-effective, the Commission on Macroeconomics and Health
defines interventions with a cost-effectiveness ratio that is less
than per capita GDP as very cost-effective.19 Because GDP per
capita in Uganda is estimated at $300 international dollars in
2006, the cost-effectiveness ratio per life year saved for traffic
safety enforcement is only 9% of GDP per capita. Few health
interventions are comparatively as cost-effective. These results
show that some interventions undertaken outside the health
sector can be extremely efficient investments in health. Policy
makers concerned with improving health should examine
improved traffic safety as a promising way to accelerate
progress toward public health.
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Seatbelt use enforcement in Iraq
Traffic police in Iraq will soon begin issuing tickets to drivers who violate the nation’s seatbelt
law. The mandate applies only to drivers, not passengers; violators will be fined 15 000 dinars
(about US$12.50, J8). Despite more urgent problems on Iraq’s roads, officials say the
enforcement of such a law has a unique purpose. ‘‘It is part of the healing process of this
country and of Baghdad to enforce the law, law by law,’’ said Brigadier General Zuhair Abada
Mraweh, traffic commander for Bagdad’s Rusafah district. ‘‘The citizens are learning the laws
step by step. We have applied all the laws concerning traffic, so it’s time for the seatbelt law to be
practiced,’’ he said. Traffic police have been a constant presence on Iraq’s roads during the last 5
years. But during that time, a high import tax on automobiles was lifted, flooding the country
with new drivers. The number of traffic crashes is unknown, but enforcing the seatbelt law could
reduce injuries by 70%, said Mraweh. Drivers agreed that enforcement of the law would be a
positive thing. ‘‘It is a symbol of civilization,’’ said taxi driver Ahmed Wahayid.
From CDC Public Health Law News, Wednesday 23 April 2008. Contributed by Jeanette
Hudson and Brian Johnston.
Lacunae
Key points
c Road crashes kill 1.2 million people every year, with most
deaths occurring in low- and middle-income countries.
c Little is known about the effectiveness or cost-effectiveness of
traffic enforcement in the developing world except for results
based on simulation models that have not been validated.
c This study offers primary data showing a 17% reduction in
traffic fatalities in the year after the Ugandan government
began a program to scale up traffic enforcement on the main
roads around the capital.
c The program cost US$72 000 per year, which amounts to
roughly $27 per life year saved, making it one of the most
cost-effective public health investments in a low-income
country like Uganda.
c Such empirical studies are needed in the developing world to
inform national and local policy choices that prioritize road
safety investments for national health and development.
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